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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether the 
affirmative defenses of setoff, recoupment, and other 
contract defenses, which arose as a consequence of alleged 
defaults under certain contracts with the debtors, 
constitute an "interest" under section 363(f) of the 
Bankruptcy Code such that a sale of the debtors' assets in 
a consolidated Bankruptcy Court auction free and clear, 
extinguished such affirmative defenses and effectively 
transformed such contract rights into unimpeachable 
accounts receivable in the hands of the purchaser. Further, 
this appeal raises a question as to whether the creditor 
whose affirmative defenses were extinguished by the 
Bankruptcy sale received constitutionally adequate notice 
such that failure to object would result in a waiver of its 
affirmative defenses and its deemed consent to the 
transformation of the debtors' contract claims into 
unimpeachable accounts receivable. 
 
We find that the affirmative defenses do not constitute an 
"interest" for purposes of section 363(f) and, therefore, were 
not extinguished by the Bankruptcy sale. A setoff right, 
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however, may only be asserted to the extent the creditor 
can prove it actually took the setoff prior to the bankruptcy 
filing. Moreover, we find that the notice of the section 363 
sale given by the debtors failed to give the creditor notice 
that it would lose its defenses and, therefore, was 
constitutionally inadequate. Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. 
 
For the most part, the parties do not dispute the facts. 
Folger Adam Security, Inc. ("Folger") instituted the 
underlying declaratory judgment action against 
DeMatteis/MacGregor Joint Venture ("DeMatteis"), along 
with three sureties, Insurance Company of North America, 
Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, and Swiss 
Reinsurance America Corporation, seeking $370,446.67 in 
unpaid "accounts receivable" relating to equipment sold to 
DeMatteis for a construction project. Folger acquired 
substantially all of the assets of three bankrupt companies 
through a bankruptcy auction "free and clear" of all claims 
and other interests.1 The facts leading up to this litigation 
are set forth below. 
 
The alleged debts that are the basis of Folger's claim 
against DeMatteis arose from a construction project at the 
Curran Fromhold Prison in Northeast Philadelphia (the 
"Northeast Project"). DeMatteis sells and installs security 
systems for use within prisons. In October 1993, 
Perini/TriState, the general contractor on the Northeast 
Project, hired DeMatteis as a subcontractor to supply 
security equipment for the project. Prior to contracting with 
DeMatteis, Perini/TriState executed a labor and 
materialman's bond on the Northeast Project, with Fidelity 
& Deposit Company of Maryland and Swiss Reinsurance 
America Corporation (then known as the North American 
Reinsurance Company) acting as sureties. Insurance 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In addition to the William Bayley Company and Folger Adam 
Company, Folger also purchased the assets of a third debtor, Stewart- 
Dicatur Security Systems, Inc., through the Bankruptcy auction. 
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Company of North America issued a similar subcontractor's 
bond in favor of DeMatteis. 
 
After contracting with Perini/TriState to supply the 
security equipment, DeMatteis sought and received 
 
proposals from the William Bayley Company ("Bayley") and 
the Folger Adam Company ("FAC") (collectively the 
"Companies" or "Debtors") to supply security hardware and 
furniture for the Northeast Project. In response to the 
proposals, DeMatteis sent letters to Bayley and FAC 
informing them that it intended to issue a purchase order 
for the equipment. On January 12, 1994, DeMatteis issued 
a purchase order to FAC for security equipment in the 
amount of $801,500.2 DeMatteis also issued a purchase 
order to Bayley on January 13, 1994, in the amount of 
$315,900. 
 
Pursuant to the purchase orders, Bayley and FAC began 
supplying materials and equipment to DeMatteis for the 
Northeast Project sometime after April 20, 1994. They 
continued to supply materials and equipment until June 6, 
1995 in the case of Bayley, and until December 20, 1995 in 
the case of FAC. After supplying all the materials, Bayley 
and FAC claimed that DeMatteis still owed them $310,648 
and 59,798.67, respectively. DeMatteis refused to pay the 
balances due, however, claiming that the Companies had 
breached their contractual obligations. Specifically, 
DeMatteis claimed that materials and equipment furnished 
by Bayley and FAC were defective, requiring repurchase of 
missing components and the performance of remedial work. 
DeMatteis also claimed that materials were delivered late, 
causing disruption to the project's schedules and a need for 
"work-arounds." 
 
Bayley and FAC advised DeMatteis that they would try to 
cure their defective performances. Shortly thereafter, on 
February 8, 1996, the Companies filed separate petitions 
for reorganization relief under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the District of Delaware. On that same date, Bayley and 
FAC filed a motion, pursuant to sections 363 and 365 of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. FAC accepted DeMatteis' purchase order subject to its letter of 
exception. 
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the Bankruptcy Code, for approval of the sale of 
substantially all of their assets to Folger which had been 
newly formed and whose management was comprised of 
many of the principals from Bayley and FAC. The Notice of 
Auction and Final Hearing on Motion to Approve the Sale of 
Substantially All of the Debtors' Assets and Assumption 
and Assignment of Certain Contracts Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
SS 363 and 365 and Providing for Final Distribution of 
Proceeds of Sale (the "Notice of Auction"), indicated that the 
sale was to be "free and clear" of all claims and other 
"interests" that could be asserted against the Debtors. The 
Notice of Auction further stated that a list of the Debtors' 
contracts that were being assumed by and assigned to 
Folger in the sale pursuant to section 365 of the 
Bankruptcy Code would be provided on or before February 
18, 1996. Although the Debtors' contracts with DeMatteis 
were specifically excluded from this list, DeMatteis only 
became aware that Folger was not assuming these 
contracts some time after the March 7, 1996 bankruptcy 
auction.3 
 
DeMatteis maintains that although it was listed on an 
affidavit of service, it did not receive the Notice of Auction 
from either of the Debtors. In support of this statement, 
DeMatteis provided the affidavit of M. MacGregor, Project 
Director for DeMatteis/MacGregor Security Constructors. In 
his affidavit, MacGregor stated that the official Notice of 
Auction was never received but, on February 15, 1996, an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Notice of Auction stated that Folger was to file with the 
Bankruptcy Court, on or before February 18, 1996, a list of those 
executory contracts and leases that it desired to accept by assignment. 
Pursuant to the terms of the notice of auction, on February 16, 1996, 
Folger filed a Notice of Designation of Executory Contracts and Leases to 
be Assumed and Assigned to Folger (the "Designation Notice"). Folger did 
not list any of the DeMatteis contracts with Bayley in the Designation 
Notice; however, Folger listed two DeMatteis contracts with FAC, one 
pertaining to the Northeast Project, and the other relating to another 
project not at issue in this case. Subsequently, on March 7, 1996, the 
Debtors and Folger filed a Notice of Removal of Designation in which 
they removed and deleted certain executory contracts previously listed in 
the Designation Notice. Included among these delisted contracts were the 
two DeMatteis contracts with FAC. Thus, none of the DeMatteis 
contracts were assumed and assigned to Folger. 
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incomplete copy of the notice was received by fax from 
another party. He further stated that he did not understand 
the Debtors' accounts receivable to include monies claimed 
by the Debtors but denied by DeMatteis because of 
nonperformance of contracts. Because it believed that the 
disputed amounts were not included among the assets 
being sold at the bankruptcy auction, DeMatteis did not file 
an objection to the sale. 
 
At the March 7, 1996 auction, Folger was the sole bidder 
and, therefore, successfully acquired substantially all of the 
assets of the Debtors. The Bankruptcy Court approved this 
sale on March 8, 1996.4 
 
Between March 20 and 22, 1996, DeMatteis completed 
four proofs of claim which it filed in the Chapter 11 
bankruptcy cases, one each with respect to the two projects 
which form the basis for the claims in this consolidated 
appeal, and the two others relating to cases pending in 
other courts. In the proofs of claim, DeMatteis asserted 
claims for replacement costs, late/incomplete delivery 
costs, quality problems, third party claims, productivity 
loss, extended overhead, loss of cash flow and interest paid, 
warranty costs, and additional bond premium associated 
with each project. On August 21, 1996, the Debtorsfiled an 
objection to the proofs of claim filed by DeMatteis, claiming 
that the March 8, 1996 order approving the sale and asset 
purchase agreement transferred the Debtors' accounts 
receivables from DeMatteis to Folger "free and clear" of all 
rights of setoff, recoupment, counterclaim and other 
defenses and claims of DeMatteis (the "Omnibus Motion"). 
DeMatteis contested this assertion, disagreeing with the 
Debtors' re-characterization of the executory contracts 
(which were specifically excluded from the sale) as 
"accounts receivable." Nonetheless, the Bankruptcy Court 
entered an order on October 10, 1996, disallowing and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Bankruptcy Court entered its approval of the sale in its Order 
Granting Motion to Approve the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors' 
Assets to Purchaser and Assumption and Assignment of Certain 
Contracts Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. SS 363 and 365 (the "Sale Order."). 
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expunging the proofs of claim objected to in the Omnibus 
Motion.5 
 
In the meantime, on May 31, 1996, Folger instituted two 
lawsuits against DeMatteis in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania asserting 
breach of contract. In Civil Action No. 96-4072, Folger 
sought money damages of $310,648, plus interest and 
costs, from DeMatteis on its contract with Bayley; and in 
Civil Action 96-4073, Folger sought money damages of 
$59,798.67, plus interest and costs, from DeMatteis on its 
contract with FAC. On September 19, 1996, the District 
Court dismissed the case at No. 96-4072 without prejudice 
to give the parties an opportunity to seek relief in the 
Bankruptcy Court. Thereafter, on December 5, 1996, Folger 
filed with the Bankruptcy Court a Motion for Determination 
that the March 8, 1996 order of the Bankruptcy Court 
approving the sale and asset purchase agreement 
transferred accounts receivable free and clear of all setoffs, 
defenses, and counterclaims, which DeMatteis opposed. 
The Bankruptcy Court concluded, however, that it lacked 
jurisdiction and dismissed Folger's Motion for 
Determination, advising the parties that the March 8, 1996 
order spoke for itself and should be interpreted by the 
courts in which the accounts receivable claims were 
pending. After the Bankruptcy Court entered its order on 
February 13, 1997, the parties agreed to resolve both cases 
together before the District court on a motion for summary 
judgment.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. On April 9, 1997, the Debtors and DeMatteis entered into a stipulation 
whereby they agreed that the Bankruptcy Court's October 10, 1996 
order disallowing and expunging certain claims against the Debtors 
would be vacated as to the claims. Thus, the amended joint liquidation 
plan was not deemed to discharge, bar, enjoin, or otherwise preclude 
DeMatteis from asserting any defense, including defenses of setoff or 
recoupment, in any action or proceeding by the Debtors or Folger. 
Approval of the stipulation agreement was included in the Bankruptcy 
Court's order confirming the plan. Ultimately, DeMatteis did not recover 
any money on its proofs of claim against Bayley and FAC because the 
bankruptcy estate lacked sufficient assets. 
 
6. By stipulation of the parties, No. 96-4073 was placed in suspense at 
the time the parties sought relief in the Bankruptcy Court. When the 
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On August 7, 1998, Folger filed a motion for summary 
judgment requesting that the Court enter judgment in its 
favor in the amounts prayed for in the complaints 
($370,466.67, plus interest and costs), and a grant 
declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2201 that the 
Bankruptcy Court's March 8, 1996 order approving the sale 
and asset purchase agreement transferred the accounts 
receivables "free and clear" of all rights of setoff, 
recoupment, counterclaim and other defenses and claims of 
DeMatteis. The District Court entered an order on 
November 25, 1998, granting Folger's motion for summary 
judgment. DeMatteis filed timely appeals in both cases on 
December 18, 1998, and this court consolidated the two 
appeals on December 30, 1998.7 
 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise de novo review over the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment. 
 
II. 
 
The dispute before us centers around the sale of the 
Debtors' assets pursuant to section 363(f) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes the trustee, under any 
one of five prescribed conditions, to sell property of the 
estate free and clear of "any interest" that an entity has in 
such property. The term "any interest," as used in section 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Bankruptcy Court dismissed Folger's motion, No. 96-4073 was taken out 
of the suspense file, transferred to the District Court and dismissed 
without prejudice while the parties prepared the cases for summary 
judgment. Although Nos. 96-4072 and 96-4073 were not formally 
consolidated, they have been litigated together from that point forward. 
 
7. After DeMatteis filed its notice of appeal in the two cases, Folger 
moved for entry of a single money judgment in the two cases that 
included the total alleged debt plus prejudgment interest and costs, for 
a total of $448,695.51. The District Court entered judgment in that 
amount on the following day, January 21, 1999, before DeMatteis had 
received service of the motion. DeMatteis also took a timely appeal from 
the judgment entered on January 21, 1999 in both cases and this court 
consolidated these appeals with the earlier two appeals on February 5, 
1999. 
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363(f), is not defined anywhere in the Bankruptcy Code. 
DeMatteis contends that the term "any interest" does not 
include affirmative defenses, such as the right of setoff or 
recoupment, or other defenses to breach of contract. On the 
other hand, the Debtors have asserted, and the District 
Court has agreed, that the sale of the Debtors' assets was 
made free and clear of all defenses as well. 
 
In reaching its conclusion, the District Court relied, in 
part, on the express language of the Sale Order, which 
provided in relevant part: 
 
       The sale of the Acquired Assets and the assignment of 
       the Assigned Contracts to Purchaser is made free and 
       clear of all liens, mortgages, security interests, 
       encumbrances, liabilities, claims, or any other 
       interests, other than the Assumed Liabilities, whether 
       arising before or after the Petition Date, . . . . 
 
Sale Order, P 3, p. 7 (emphasis added). Although the Sale 
Order did not explicitly state that the sale included 
defenses, the District Court nonetheless concluded that 
"[t]he term `any other interests' necessarily include[d] 
defenses within its scope." Folger Adam Security, Inc. v. 
DeMatteis/MacGregor, JV, et al., No. 96-4072/4073, slip op. 
at 6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1998). 
 
The District Court found further support for its 
conclusion in Paragraph 4 of the Sale Order, which stated: 
 
       Any and all creditors of the Debtors are permanently 
       enjoined and restrained from seeking to obtain 
       payment or satisfaction of their claims against the 
       Debtors from the Purchaser or the Acquired Assets, 
       except for and only to the extent of the Assumed 
       Liabilities. 
 
Sale Order, P 4, p. 8. Because this provision specifically 
enjoined creditors from seeking to obtain payment or 
satisfaction of their claims, the District Court found the 
Sale Order was made free and clear of all interests 
including contract defenses. Folger Adam Security, slip op. 
at 6. Our review of the case law and other authority 
requires us to find, contrary to the District Court, that "any 
interest" under section 363(f) does not include defenses to 
claims. 
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Under the rule of ejusdem generis, the term"other 
interest" would ordinarily be limited to interests of the same 
kind as those enumerated, i.e., "liens, mortgages, security 
interests, encumbrances, liabilities, [and] claims." Similarly, 
the canon of construction noscitur a sociis"instructs that a 
provision should not be viewed `in isolation but in light of 
the words that accompany it and give [it] meaning.' " Ballay, 
et al. v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 688 
(3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash , 490 U.S. 
107, 115 (1989)). We noted in Ballay that when construing 
the meaning of one term in a phrase, the Supreme Court 
has stated: 
 
       The maxim noscitur a sociis, that a word is known by 
       the company it keeps, while not an inescapable rule, is 
       often wisely applied where a word is capable of many 
       meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended 
       breadth to Acts of Congress. 
 
Id. (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 
(1961)). With these canons of construction in mind, we turn 
to the case law construing the term "any interest" under 
section 363(f). 
 
Courts faced with the task of defining the scope of the 
term "any interest" have been unable to provide a precise 
definition. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy P 363.06[1]. Although 
some courts have narrowly interpreted that phrase to mean 
only in rem interests in property, see e.g., In re Fairchild 
Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. 910, 917-19 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
1995), vacated on other grounds, 220 B.R. 909 (Bankr. 
W.D. Tex. 1998), the trend seems to be towards a broader 
interpretation which includes other obligations that may 
flow from ownership of the property. 3 Collier on 
Bankruptcy P 363.06[1] (citing In re Leckie Smokeless Coal 
Co., 99 F.3d 573, 582 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that debtor 
coal mine operators could sell their assets underS 363(f) 
free and clear of successor liability that otherwise would 
have arisen under federal statute); In re P.K.R. Convalescent 
Centers, Inc., 189 B.R. 90, 92-94 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) 
(holding that S 363(f) permitted sale free and clear of state's 
depreciation-recapture interest in the debtor's property); In 
re WBQ Partnership, 189 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) 
(holding statutory right to recover depreciation was within 
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"interests" under S 363(f); In re White Motor Credit Corp., 75 
B.R. 944 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that S 363(f) 
precluded tort claims against asset purchaser)). 
 
In Leckie, certain employer-sponsored benefit plans (the 
"plans") objected to the extinguishment of their right to 
payment of plan liabilities from a successor-in-interest by 
operation of S 363(f). In determining whether the plans had 
"any interest in property" within the meaning of S 363(f), 
the court of appeals in Leckie rejected"an unduly broad 
interpretation" of that phrase by the district court, which 
found that simply the right to demand money from the 
debtor gave rise to an "interest" in the debtor's property 
under section 363(f). 99 F.3d at 581. The court of appeals 
equated such interests to general unsecured claims which 
have not been recognized by the courts as constituting 
"interests" within the meaning of section 363(f). Id. 
(citations omitted). 
 
The court of appeals then noted that: 
 
       ... while the plain meaning of the phrase "interest in 
       such property" suggests that not all general rights to 
       payment are encompassed by the statute, Congress did 
       not expressly indicate that, by employing such 
       language, it intended to limit the scope of section 363(f) 
       to in rem interests, strictly defined, and we decline to 
       adopt such a restricted reading of the statute here. 
 
Id. at 582 (citations omitted). The court abstained from 
defining the term "any interest" categorically, preferring to 
let future decisional law frame the boundaries of the term. 
 
In concluding that the plans' right to payment 
constituted an "interest" within the meaning of section 
363(f), the court in Leckie was persuaded by the fact that 
the right of the plans to seek such payment was predicated 
upon the fact that the assets being sold were used in coal 
mining operations. Id. Thus, the court's holding seems to 
suggest that the term "any interest" is intended to refer to 
obligations that are connected to, or arise from, the 
property being sold. 3 Collier on BankruptcyP 363.06[1]. 
 
In both PKR Convalescent Centers and WBQ Partnership, 
a state agency had the right under state law to recapture 
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depreciation from operators of nursing homes if the 
operators realized a gain on the sale of their real property. 
The statute further provided that if the operators failed to 
reimburse the state, the agency had the right to pursue the 
purchasers for the amount owed. In those cases, the 
Bankruptcy Courts held that because the state agency 
could be compelled in a legal or equitable proceeding to 
accept a money satisfaction of its statutory right to 
depreciation recapture, such interest fell within section 
363(f)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code and thus was 
extinguished by the "free and clear" sale. 8 PKR Convalescent 
Centers, 189 B.R. at 94; WBQ Partnership, 189 B.R. at 107. 
Thus, the holdings of the courts suggest that any interest 
in property that can be reduced to a money satisfaction 
constitutes a claim for purposes of section 363(f) and, 
therefore, attaches to the proceeds of the sale. PKR 
Convalescent Centers, 189 B.R. at 94; WBQ Partnership, 
189 B.R. at 106. Accordingly, the courts held that the 
S 363(f) sale extinguished the state agency's interest in the 
properties. 
 
The terms "lien" and "setoff" have also been distinguished 
within the purview of S 363(f). In Marley v. United States, 
381 F.2d 738, 743 (Ct.Cl. 1967), the Court of Claims noted 
that the terms "setoff" and "lien" "connote independent 
concepts, governed by distinct legal principles."9 Id. at 743. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Section 363(f)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code provides essentially that the 
trustee may sell property of the estate free and clear of any interest in 
such property if an entity with an interest is such property "could be 
compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money 
satisfaction of such interest." 11 U.S.C. S 363(f)(5). 
 
9. In Marley, the government had asserted a right of setoff in a contract 
dispute with the debtor in the Court of Claims prior to the 
commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. 381 F.2d 738 (Ct.Cl. 
1967). When the trustee applied to sell the debtor's contract claims 
against the government and the government failed tofile an answer 
objecting to such application, the bankruptcy court authorized the sale 
of the contracts free and clear of liens and forever barred the government 
from asserting any lien against the contracts or proceeds from the sale 
of such contracts. The contracts were subsequently purchased by Marley 
who filed an action in the Court of Claims on claims against the 
government arising out of the purchased contracts. The government filed 
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The court turned to the definitions of these terms to 
illustrate its point. "Setoff," the court stated, referred to 
" `situations where both plaintiff and defendant have 
independent causes of action maintainable against each 
other in separate actions which can be mutually deducted 
whenever either one brings a suit against the other.' " Id. 
(quoting Motto v. United States, 360 F.2d 643, 645 (Ct. Cl. 
1966)) (other citation omitted). In contrast, the court noted 
that a "lien" has been defined as " `a charge or 
encumbrance upon property to secure the payment or 
performance of a debt, duty, or other obligation. It is 
distinct from the obligation which it secures.' " Id. (citations 
omitted). Mortgages, security interests, encumbrances and 
liabilities possess characteristics similar to a lien. 
 
It is clear from the definitions of "lien" and "setoff" that 
the term "setoff" does not refer to the same type of interest 
as a "lien." A lien is distinct from the obligation it secures 
while the same is not true of a right of setoff or 
recoupment. They have no value separate and apart from a 
debtor's or purchaser's claim. Thus, under the canons of 
construction set forth previously, the phrase "any other 
interests" would not include setoff and recoupment since 
those interests are not similar to those enumerated in the 
Notice of Auction. 
 
Folger equates the affirmative defenses raised by 
DeMatteis to "claims" in order to subject them to the "free 
and clear" provision of section 363(f). We find, however, 
that a defense is not the same as a claim. The Bankruptcy 
Code sets forth the meaning of the word "claim" as a: 
 
       right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced 
       to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
a counterclaim and asserted the defense of setoff which Marley moved to 
strike based on the bankruptcy court's sell order. The Court of Claims 
held that even though the sale order stated that the sale was free and 
clear of the government's liens and claims, the sale of the contracts was 
not free and clear of the government's right of setoff since the 
government had raised that defense in a proceeding instituted prior to 
the sale of the contracts, a fact of which Marley was aware at the time 
of the bankruptcy sale. Id. at 743. 
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       contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
       undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured;. . 
       . 
 
11 U.S.C. S 101(5)(A). The Bankruptcy Code further 
provides that "claim" also means a right to an equitable 
remedy for breach of performance when the breach triggers 
a right to payment. 11 U.S.C. S 101(5)(B). 
 
Although the Bankruptcy Code's definition of claim is 
broad, a claim requires an enforceable obligation of the 
debtor to pay the claimant. Pennsylvania Dep't of Public 
Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 559 (1990). Here 
DeMatteis is not seeking to recover money on an 
enforceable obligation of Folger, but rather, is asserting 
only defenses to claims by Folger.10 Indeed, a defense seeks 
to diminish a claim or to defeat recovery rather than to 
share in it. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (6th ed. 1990). 
 
In this case, DeMatteis has asserted several contract 
defenses, including a right of recoupment as well as setoff. 
Along these lines, a number of courts have held that a right 
of recoupment is a defense and not a claim in the 
bankruptcy context. See, e.g., Lee v. Schweiker , 739 F.2d 
870, 875 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Lawrence United Corp., 221 
B.R. 661, 669 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Bram , 179 B.R. 
824, 827 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995); In re Izaguirre, 166 B.R. 
484, 493 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994). For example, in Lee v. 
Schweiker, we provided the following explication of the 
doctrine of recoupment: 
 
       Recoupment . . . allows the creditor to assert that 
       certain mutual claims extinguish one another in 
       bankruptcy, in spite of the fact that they could not be 
       "setoff" under 11 U.S.C. S 553. The justification for the 
       recoupment doctrine is that where the creditor's claim 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Although DeMatteis filed proofs of claim against the Debtors on 
unsecured and non-priority claims relating to the alleged substandard 
performances of the Debtors, those proofs of claim are not at issue here. 
Insufficient assets existed in the estate for a distribution on these 
claims. Moreover, because the Sale Order enjoins DeMatteis and other 
creditors from seeking payment from Folger of any claims against the 
Debtors, Folger does not have an enforceable obligation to pay such 
claims against the Debtors in this or any other litigation. 
 
                                14 
 
 
       against the debtor arises from the same transaction as 
       the debtor's claim, it is essentially a defense  to the 
       debtor's claim against the creditor rather than a 
       mutual obligation, and application of the limitations on 
       setoff in bankruptcy would be inequitable. See In re 
       Monongahela Rye Liquors, 141 F.2d [864,] at 869 [(3d 
       Cir. 1944)]. 
 
739 F.2d at 875. 
 
Moreover, in In re Lawrence United Corp., the Bankruptcy 
Court held that an insurance company's alleged right of 
recoupment was not an "interest" in property within the 
meaning of section 363(f) and thus was not affected by the 
Bankruptcy Court's order authorizing the sale "free and 
clear" of all liens and interests. 221 B.R. at 669. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Bankruptcy Court opined 
that: 
 
       The right of recoupment is not itself a claim and any 
       right of recoupment [the insurance company] may have 
       does not even fall under the broadest interpretation of 
       an "interest" in property. Under common law, the right 
       of recoupment is a defense to a debtor's claim against 
       the creditor; it is not a mutual obligation. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). The Bankruptcy Court distinguished 
the In re Lawrence United Corp. case from In re Leckie 
Smokeless Coal Co. and P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs., Inc., 
cases which both involved an "interest" in property by 
virtue of statutes that created a purchaser's liability on the 
sale of assets. In In re Lawrence United Corp. , the Court 
noted that the dispute over the right to recoupment 
centered on what was actually purchased in the "free and 
clear" sale as opposed to what purchaser liabilities resulted 
from the purchase. Id. Because any right of recoupment 
that the insurance company had derived from the collected 
premiums the debtor owed to it and arose from the same 
transaction or set of transactions involving the 
commissions the insurance company owed to the debtor, 
the court found the sale of the debtor's insurance policy 
accounts did not extinguish the insurance company's 
recoupment defense. 
 
                                15 
 
 
In the case before us, Folger argues that In re Lawrence 
United Corp. is not dispositive for several reasons. It points 
to three distinguishing factors in that case -- that the 
insurance company actually filed an objection to the sale, 
the express language of the contract provided for a right of 
recoupment, and that the Bankruptcy Court eventually 
found that the insurance company did not have a right of 
recoupment against the commissions earned post-petition. 
But none of these factors informed the court's holding that 
a right of recoupment is a defense and thus does not fall 
under the broadest interpretation of "an interest in 
property." Rather, the court looked to the common law in 
concluding that the right of recoupment is a defense to the 
debtor's claim against the creditor. Moreover, we have 
previously held that an express contractual right is not 
required to effect a recoupment. In re University Medical 
Ctr., 973 F.2d 1065, 1080 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
As noted previously, we have likewise held that the right 
of recoupment is a defense, not a claim. Lee v. Schweiker, 
supra. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Folger's 
attempts to distinguish Lawrence United Corp.  Thus, 
whether or not DeMatteis properly failed to object to the 
section 363(f) sale to Folger has no bearing on whether "any 
other interests" includes defenses such as recoupment and 
setoff. 
 
Neither the parties nor the District Court has cited a 
single decision which has held that a defense  may be 
extinguished as a result of a "free and clear" sale. Likewise, 
we have not found any such authority to exist. We note 
that all of the cases cited by the District Court in support 
of its holding that "an interest in property" should be 
construed broadly to include defenses, involved affirmative 
claims brought by a creditor; none of these cases raised a 
defense to a debtor's or purchaser's claim. On the other 
hand, at least one Bankruptcy Court has found that a 
recoupment defense is not extinguished by a "free and 
clear" sale, and a number of other courts, including this 
one, have held that a right of recoupment is a defense and 
not a claim. Thus, we agree with the Bankruptcy Court in 
In re Lawrence United Corp. and hold that a right of 
recoupment is a defense and not an interest and therefore 
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is not extinguished by a S 363(f) sale.11 The District Court's 
conclusion to the contrary therefore constitutes legal error. 
 
Although its primary defense to Folger's claims is 
recoupment, DeMatteis has also asserted a defense of setoff 
based on amounts owed by Bayley and FAC to DeMatteis as 
a result of breaches of other contracts for other prison 
construction projects. DeMatteis has conceded that 
property that is otherwise subject to a right of setoff under 
section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code may not be setoff if it 
has been the subject of a section 363(f) "free and clear" 
sale. DeMatteis contends, however, that property as to 
which a setoff has been taken prior to bankruptcy is not 
property of the estate that would be subject to setoff, but 
rather, is the property of the party that took the setoff. In 
support of its argument, DeMatteis cites Pioneer 
Commercial Funding Corp. v. United Airlines, Inc. , 122 B.R. 
871, 877-78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), and 4 Collier on 
Bankruptcy, P 553.01. Thus, DeMatteis claims that to the 
extent it took setoffs relating to the prison projects prior to 
the filing of the bankruptcy petition, that property was not 
subject to the section 363 sale and, therefore, it is entitled 
to raise a setoff defense against Folger's claims here. 
 
In response, Folger argues that this case is 
distinguishable from Pioneer because DeMatteis has not 
actually taken a setoff against the receivables. Because 
DeMatteis did not actually take a setoff, but merely 
asserted a right to setoff, Folger contends the receivables 
were property of the estate and therefore the right of setoff 
was extinguished by section 553. Folger further contends 
that because the "claims" asserted by DeMatteis against 
Folger arise out of more than one transaction, recoupment 
is not available here. Finally, Folger claims DeMatteis 
cannot assert setoff and recoupment defenses in the same 
action. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The Sale Order enjoined creditors from seeking to obtain payment or 
satisfaction of their claims against the Debtors from the Purchaser or 
Acquired Assets. Since we have determined that affirmative defenses are 
not claims under S 363(f), this restriction does not apply to DeMatteis' 
defenses to Folger's claims. 
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The District Court noted the exception raised by 
DeMatteis but found, nonetheless, that it had no 
 
application here since the amounts DeMatteis attempted to 
setoff before the filing of the bankruptcy petition had not 
yet been received.12 Folger Adams Security, slip op. at 8. 
Thus, the District Court concluded the property subject to 
setoff was still part of the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 9. 
Consequently, the District Court held that the section 363 
sale extinguished DeMatteis's setoff rights. Id. 
 
To decide this question, we turn first to section 553 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. Section 553(a) provides in relevant 
part: 
 
       Except as otherwise provided in this section and in 
       sections 362 and 363 of this title, this title does not 
       affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt 
       owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before 
       commencement of the case, . . . 
 
11 U.S.C. S 553(a). The legislative history to section 553 
bears out the plain meaning of that provision. The Senate 
Report explains: 
 
       This section [553] preserves, with some changes, the 
       right of setoff in bankruptcy cases. . . . One exception 
       to this right is the automatic stay, discussed in 
       connection with proposed 11 U.S.C. S 362. Another is 
       the right of the trustee to use property under section 
       363 that is subject to a right of setoff. 
 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 91 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5877. Thus, in order 
to maintain a right of setoff under section 553, the party 
asserting the right must show: 
 
       1. A debt exists from the creditor to the debtor and 
       that debt arose prior to the commencement of the 
       bankruptcy case. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The basis for the District Court's conclusion, that the amounts 
DeMatteis attempted to setoff before the bankruptcyfiling had not yet 
been received, is unclear. As we note infra, the record here does not 
provide any evidence of actual setoffs taken or received prior to the 
filing 
of the bankruptcy petition. 
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       2. The creditor has a claim against the debtor which 
       arose prior to the commencement of the 
       bankruptcy case. 
 
       3. The debt and the claim are mutual obligations. 
 
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 814 F.2d 1030, 
1035 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting In re Nickerson & Nickerson, 
Inc., 62 B.R. 83, 85 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986)); see also In re 
Sherry & O'Leary, Inc., 148 B.R. 248, 252-53 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 1992). Even if the above three requirements are met, 
the right of setoff will be extinguished if either sections 362 
or 363 are invoked. 
 
In this case, the Debtor invoked section 363 to effectuate 
a "free and clear" sale of the estate property. Consequently, 
assuming DeMatteis has met the three requirements to 
maintain a right of setoff, under section 553 its setoff rights 
are subject to section 363 and therefore are extinguished 
by the "free and clear sale." 
 
It is possible that an exception to this finding exists 
where the setoff rights are actually taken prior to the 
commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. In Pioneer 
Commercial Funding Corp., the account debtor of the 
debtor's accounts receivable filed a motion for relief from 
stay. 122 B.R. at 876. The account debtor loaned the 
debtor $3.5 million for which it received a promissory note 
guaranteeing payment. Id. at 875. Prior to the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition, the debtor directed the clearing house 
utilized for collecting and disbursing the accounts 
receivable, to setoff the account debtor's obligations to 
debtor by the $3.5 million against the debtor's accounts 
receivable. Id. Also prior to the bankruptcyfiling, the 
assignee of the debtor's accounts receivable instituted suit 
against the account debtor for conversion and tortious 
interference with a contract, claiming the account debtor 
knew of the assignee's contract rights with the debtor when 
it took the setoff. Id. at 876. In the bankruptcy proceeding, 
the assignee sought damages for any setoffs actually taken 
by the account debtor prior to the debtor's bankruptcy 
filing. Id. The district court there held that the automatic 
stay provisions are not implicated with regard to setoffs 
already taken by the account debtor for the reason that 
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funds already set off are not estate property under the 
Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 877. 
 
The record before us does not show if or when DeMatteis 
actually took a setoff against the construction contracts. 
Because the motion for summary judgment was filed before 
any discovery took place, DeMatteis may not have had an 
opportunity to develop the record to adduce evidence that 
it had actually taken a setoff against some of the contracts 
prior to the bankruptcy filing. On remand, the District 
Court should allow DeMatteis an opportunity to 
supplement the record to supply any needed 
documentation. In our view, DeMatteis must prove that it 
actually took a setoff, the amounts and against which 
contracts, before the bankruptcy filing. This does not mean 
it actually must have received funds, but that its accounts 
receivable were reduced or offset. To the extent that 
DeMatteis is able to prove an actual setoff prior to 
bankruptcy, the property subject to setoff is not deemed 
part of the bankruptcy estate and therefore was not subject 
to the section 363 sale. Thus, DeMatteis may assert a 
defense of setoff but only to the extent it took an actual 
setoff prior to bankruptcy. 
 
We note that the facts here indicate that DeMatteis is 
seeking to offset Folger's claims by the costs it incurred due 
to the Debtors' alleged breach of contract arising out of the 
same contract, as well as out of other contracts from other 
construction projects. To the extent the amount being 
claimed by Folger and the amount of reduction sought by 
DeMatteis arise from the same contract, DeMatteis' defense 
will be one of recoupment. However, to the extent the 
amount being claimed by Folger and the amount of 
reduction sought by DeMatteis arise from different 
contracts, DeMatteis' defense will be one of setoff. We 
express no opinion as to whether DeMatteis has established 
the requisite elements of either defense, as that 
determination is best left for the District Court in the first 
instance. We hold only that DeMatteis is not precluded 
from asserting these contract defenses against Folger's 
claims provided, as to the setoff defense, DeMatteis proves 
it actually took the setoff prior to the bankruptcy. 
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Our holding is further supported by good policy reasons. 
First of all, if we were to hold that DeMatteis' contract 
defenses were extinguished by the section 363(f) sale, the 
value of the Debtors' assets purchased by Folger would be 
enhanced at DeMatteis' expense. Bankruptcy law generally 
does not permit a debtor or an estate to assume the 
benefits of a contract and reject the unfavorable aspects of 
the same contract. Lee, 739 F.2d at 876. Yet, allowing the 
Debtors to recharacterize their contract rights as accounts 
receivable and sell them free and clear of the corresponding 
obligations yields that very result.13  Second, the equities do 
not favor Folger and the Debtors here. Folger is not an 
innocent party. Many of Folger's principals were also 
principals of the Debtors. Thus, they should have been 
aware of the dispute regarding the DeMatteis' construction 
contracts. Indeed, the DeMatteis contracts were removed 
from the Designation Notice, presumably because Folger 
was not willing to have those contracts assumed and 
assigned to it knowing that DeMatteis contested full 
payment because of the Debtors' alleged default under 
those contracts. Thus, Folger should have been aware of 
DeMatteis' contract defenses when it established the 
purchase price for the Debtors' assets. Accordingly, we do 
not see anything inequitable in allowing DeMatteis to raise 
defenses to Folger's claims of breach of contract. 
 
III. 
 
Even if we were to find that the term "any interest" 
included affirmative defenses, the notice to DeMatteis was 
insufficient to give it notice that by failing to object it was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. DeMatteis makes a persuasive argument that prior to the sale, 
separate "accounts receivable" and "contracts" did not exist between 
itself and the Debtors, and that Folger has recharacterized the contracts 
as "accounts receivable" because the contracts were removed from the 
Designation Notice. DeMatteis' argument appears to have merit. The only 
way Folger can prevail here is to recharacterize the contracts as 
accounts receivable since the Joint Liquidating Plan approved by the 
Bankruptcy Court specifically preserved DeMatteis' right to raise its 
defenses (in particular, recoupment and setoff,) to claims against it 
arising out of the contracts not assumed or assigned to Folger. 
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waiving its affirmative defenses.14 Section 363(b)(1) of the 
Bankruptcy Code provides that the trustee may use, sell or 
lease estate property only "after notice and a hearing." 11 
U.S.C. S 363(b)(1). The phrase "after notice and a hearing" 
is defined in section 102 of the Bankruptcy Code as follows: 
 
       (1) "after notice and a hearing", or a similar phrase-- 
 
       (A) means such notice as is appropriate in the 
       particular circumstances, and such opportunity for a 
       hearing as is appropriate in the particular 
       circumstances; but 
 
       (B) authorizes an act without an actual hearing if 
       such notice is given properly and if-- 
 
        (i) such a hearing is not requested timely by a 
       party in interest; or 
 
        (2) there is insufficient time for a hearing to be 
       commenced before such act must be done, and the 
       court authorizes such act; 
 
11 U.S.C. S 102(1). The notice requirement and procedure 
for sales is set forth in Bankruptcy Rules 6004 and 2002. 
Essentially, Rule 6004 requires that notice of a proposed 
sale of property shall be given in accordance with Rule 
2002(a)(2), (c) and (i).15 Rule 2002(a)(2) directs the clerk to 
give all parties in interest at least twenty days' notice by 
mail of a proposed sale of property. According to Rule 
2002(c), sufficient notice includes the time and place of any 
public sale, the terms and conditions of any private sale, 
states the time for filing objections, and, if real estate is 
being sold, provides a general description of the property. 
See also, In re Karpe, 84 B.R. 926, 930 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 
1988). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Although DeMatteis appears to raise an issue of fact with regard to 
whether it actually received the Notice of Auction sent by Debtors' 
counsel, we will assume, for sake of argument, that the Notice of Auction 
was received so that we may proceed to what we perceive as the 
determinative issue, that is, whether the Notice of Auction was sufficient 
to inform DeMatteis that its affirmative defenses would be extinguished 
by the proposed S 363(f) sale if it did notfile an objection by a certain 
date. 
 
15. Subsection (i) of Rule 2002 is not relevant to this appeal. 
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In addition to the Bankruptcy Rules, we are guided by 
due process considerations. Due process requires"notice 
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprize interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
314-15 (1950) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court 
further found that the notice which comports with due 
process must be of such nature as to reasonably convey the 
required information. Id. at 314. 
 
Informed by these rules and constitutional 
considerations, we conclude that the Notice of Auction here 
did not provide DeMatteis with any information to put it on 
notice that the phrase "any other interests" included 
contract defenses and, by failing to object, it would waive 
such defenses. Our conclusion is based upon consideration 
of the express language of the Notice of Auction as well as 
the surrounding facts and circumstances. The Notice of 
Auction expressly provided that the proposed sale of the 
Debtors' assets would be "free and clear of all liens, 
mortgages, security interests, encumbrances, liabilities, 
claims or any other interests, of any nature." We have 
already found that the phrase "any other interests" does 
not include defenses. Moreover, nowhere in the Notice of 
Auction do the Debtors state that affirmative defenses will 
be waived, nor are we aware of any court to have ever ruled 
that affirmative defenses are extinguished in a section 
363(f) sale. For these reasons, we find the Notice of Auction 
reasonably failed to convey the required information, i.e., 
that the sale included defenses to claims and, therefore, 
was constitutionally infirm. 
 
Moreover, the two DeMatteis contracts originally listed in 
the Designation Notice as being assumed and assigned to 
Folger were subsequently removed from the list, leaving 
DeMatteis with the impression that none of its contracts 
were being assumed and assigned in the proposed sale to 
Folger. Indeed, the express language of the Designation 
Notice implies that only those non-debtor counter parties 
whose interests were being assumed and assigned to Folger 
needed to file an objection and, since none of DeMatteis's 
contracts were assumed/assigned to Folger, the permanent 
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bar simply does not apply to DeMatteis.16  Thus, DeMatteis 
reasonably believed that its rights would not be affected by 
the proposed sale. Under these facts and circumstances, we 
cannot say that DeMatteis waived its affirmative defenses 
by failing to object to the proposed sale. Thus, the District 
Court's conclusion to the contrary constitutes legal error. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that DeMatteis is entitled to raise 
the defense of recoupment and any other defenses it may 
have with respect to the disputed Bayley and FAC 
contracts, in response to the lawsuits brought by Folger. 
On remand, DeMatteis will have to prove, and the District 
Court will have to decide, whether DeMatteis is entitled to 
any of these defenses. It may only assert a right of setoff to 
the extent it can show it actually took a setoff prior to the 
bankruptcy filing. Thus, on remand, DeMatteis should be 
allowed to adduce proof of any setoffs taken prior to the 
bankruptcy petition.17 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court granting summary judgment 
in favor of Folger and remand to the District Court for 
further proceedings. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The Designation Notice specifically states that unless a non-debtor 
counter party to an "Assigned Contract" filed a written objection to the 
assumption/assignment by the deadline, the counter-party shall be 
forever barred from asserting any default, loss or liability against the 
assignee of such Assigned Contract (i.e., Folger) based on any event or 
circumstance arising prior to the date of the assignment. 
 
17. Because we have found that the bankruptcy sale did not extinguish 
DeMatteis' affirmative defenses, we need not address DeMatteis' 
additional argument that the District Court erred in calculating the 
award of prejudgment interest. 
 
                                24 
 
 
STAPLETON, J., concurring: 
 
I would resolve this appeal by answering a single 
question: Does S 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code authorize a 
sale of a debtor's account receivable free and clear of any 
defenses arising from the performance or non-performance 
of the contract giving rise to the account receivable? Such 
defenses, properly characterized as rights of recoupment, 
are to be distinguished from rights of set-off, which consist 
of offsetting claims arising under contracts other than the 
one giving rise to the account receivable. There is no 
occasion here to address the issue of whether S 363(f) 
authorizes a sale of an account receivable free and clear of 
a right to a set-off.1 DeMatteis concedes that under the 
Bankruptcy Code the sale extinguished any set-off right 
that was not exercised more than 90 days before thefiling 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The effect of a S 363(f) "free and clear" sale on set-off rights is a 
fundamentally different issue than the effect of such a sale on 
recoupment rights. The Bankruptcy Code expressly preempts some state 
laws regarding set-offs. See 11 U.S.C. SS 363(f), 506(a), 553. Moreover, 
set-offs, which do not relate to the performance of the contract giving 
rise to the account receivable, do not operate to define the property sold 
in the same way that a right to recoupment does. See 13 U.S.C. 
S 547(a)(3); 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 9106. Instead, "[s]etoff allows 
adjustments of mutual debts arising out of separate transactions 
between the parties." In re Harmon, 188 B.R. 421, 425 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1995) (emphasis added); accord Lee v. Schweiker , 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3d 
Cir. 1984). This is an important distinction because it follows that a 
person asserting a set-off, including even a previously exercised set-off, 
against an account receivable that the Bankruptcy Court purported to 
sell "free and clear" is not interpreting the Court's order to determine 
what in fact was sold, but rather is essentially challenging the 
Bankruptcy Court's authority to approve the sale of property that was 
not part of the bankrupt's estate. Such an argument may well be barred 
by S 363(m), which provides that reversal on appeal of an authorization 
under S 363 does not affect the validity of the sale to a good faith 
purchaser. See 11 U.S.C. S 363(m); see also In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 
997-98 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that failure to obtain the stay required 
by S 363(m) moots question of whether bankruptcy court lacked 
authority to sell property that did not belong to the debtor's estate). I 
do 
not address this issue, nor the related question of whether despite 
S 363(m), sale of an exercised set-off may be challenged on notice 
grounds, but simply note that set-offs present issues not implicated by 
rights of recoupment. 
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of the petition, see 11 U.S.C. S 553(b), and the District 
Court's decision regarding rights of set-off can be upheld on 
the ground that DeMatteis has tendered no evidence of 
such an exercise.2 Nor is there occasion here to address the 
adequacy of the notice given by the trustee. Concluding, as 
I do, that S 363(f) does not authorize a sale free and clear 
of rights of recoupment, the judgment of the District Court 
must be reversed without regard to the sufficiency of the 
notice. 
 
Section 363(f) authorizes the trustee, under specific 
circumstances, to sell property of the estate "free and clear 
of any interest in such property." 11 U.S.C.S 363(f). Here, 
the property of the estate that was sold was accounts 
receivable, and, accordingly, the issue for decision is 
whether defenses arising out of the performance or non- 
performance of the contract giving rise to the account 
receivable are "interest[s] in such property." 
 
"Property interests are created and defined by state law. 
Unless some federal interest requires a different result, 
there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed 
differently simply because an interested party is involved in 
a bankruptcy proceeding." Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 
48, 54 (1979); Integrated Solutions, Inc. v. Service Support 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.  In response to Folger's motion for summary judgment, DeMatteis had 
the burden of either coming forward with evidence that would support a 
judgment in its favor, i.e. evidence that its set-offs were exercised more 
than ninety days prior to the bankruptcy petition, or filing a Rule 56(f) 
affidavit specifying that discovery was necessary to secure a basis for a 
defense. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56. DeMatteis did neither. "[U]nder 
Pennsylvania law, a setoff is accomplished when a creditor gives 
`sufficient evidence of intent' to make a setoff." IRS v. Norton, 717 F.2d 
767, 772 (3d Cir. 1983). While there is evidence that DeMatteis 
expressed dissatisfaction with Bayley and FAC's performance on each of 
the various contracts at various times more than ninety days prior to the 
bankruptcy petition, and, indeed, that it canceled its orders and refused 
to make further payments, this is evidence only of an intent to exercise 
its rights of recoupment. There is no evidence that DeMatteis expressed 
any intention to set-off its rights under one contract against its 
liabilities 
under another. Indeed, the notice that was given to Bayley and FAC that 
DeMatteis was refusing to make further payments on the contracts at 
issue here referred only to Bayley and FAC's breach of those contracts; 
it made no mention of any other contracts. 
                                 26 
 
 
Specialities, Inc., 124 F.3d 487, 492 (3d Cir. 1997). Under 
Pennsylvania law, the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.)--Secured Transactions (Chapter 9) governs"any 
sale of accounts or chattel paper." 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 9102(a)(2). "Account" is defined as"any right to payment 
for goods sold or leased or for services rendered which is 
not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether 
or not it has been earned by performance." 13 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. S 9106. The Code is consistent with this concept of an 
account receivable. It defines a "receivable" as a "right to 
payment, whether or not such right has been earned by 
performance." 11 U.S.C. S 547(a)(3). 
 
Thus, for present purposes, an account receivable is a 
right to payment which arises upon the inception of the 
contract at a point when no performance has been rendered 
and no payment earned. This understanding of a receivable 
is inconsistent with the notion that defenses arising from 
the performance or non-performance of the contract giving 
rise to it are "interests in" the receivable. A recoupment 
defense simply does not constitute an interest in the right 
to payment under the contract. Rather, it serves only to 
define and limit that right. See 5 Collier on Bankruptcy 
S 553.10 (explaining that "recoupment applies to define the 
obligation in question"). 
 
Moreover, to construe S 363(f) to authorize a sale of a 
receivable that would strip defenses based on performance 
would run counter to the "fundamental principle[of the 
Code] that the estate succeeds only to the nature and rights 
of the property interest that the debtor possessed pre- 
petition," Integrated Solutions, Inc., 124 F.3d at 495, and 
that the estate should not receive a "windfall merely by 
reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy." Butner, 440 
U.S. at 55. Prior to bankruptcy, Bayley and FAC held rights 
to payment that may or may not have been earned. If the 
"free and clear" sale had extinguished defenses arising from 
the debtor's performance, a fundamental transformation in 
the nature of the debtor's property would have occurred 
with a resulting windfall to the estate. While Bayley and 
FAC on the filing date held only rights to payment subject 
to the terms of the contracts, the estate would have been 
able to sell the equivalent of negotiable instruments. 
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Because I find in S 363(f) and the remainder of the Code 
no evidence of a congressional intent to authorize such a 
windfall and because a recoupment defense is in no sense 
an interest in the right to payment, I too would reverse the 
judgment of the District Court and remand for further 
proceedings. 
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